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#TWEETING FOR TERRORISM:
FIRST AMENDMENT IMPLICATIONS IN USING
PROTERRORIST TWEETS TO CONVICT UNDER THE
MATERIAL SUPPORT STATUTE
Abigail M. Pierce*
INTRODUCTION
“Terrorist attacks can shake the foundations of our biggest buildings, but they
cannot touch the foundation of America. These acts shatter steel, but they cannot dent
the steel of American resolve.”1 Although inspirational, these words carry little truth
today. September 11, 2001, stole two landmark buildings, the security of the American
people, and many innocent lives. Most importantly, however, September 11, 2001,
threatened the very foundation America was built on: freedom. As the War on Terror
began, the First Amendment came under attack, and Americans began to lose the very
freedoms that the Founders fought so hard to preserve.2 The War on Terror paralleled
another unimaginable phenomenon: the rise of the internet. The rise of the internet
introduced social media, including Twitter,3 allowing people around the world to con-
nect and share information at the click of a button. As the War on Terror and the rise
of the internet continued to evolve and turn the world on its head, both began to add
new challenges to constitutional interpretations of the First Amendment. This Note
will discuss these challenges, arguing that proterrorist tweets can be used to convict an
individual under the Material Support Statute without violating the First Amendment,
so long as the government has evidence that the defendant acted in coordination with
a foreign terrorist organization.4
This Note is split into three parts. Part I will introduce Professor Steven Salaita,
a University of Illinois professor who lost his job because of his anti-Israel tweets.5
* J.D. Candidate, 2016, William & Mary Law School; B.A., Christopher Newport Uni-
versity, 2013. I’d like to thank my biggest role model, my mom, Susan Molineux, who
inspires me every single day to strive for greatness.
1 President George W. Bush, President’s Address to the Nation (Sept. 11, 2001), http://
abcnews.go.com/US/story?id=92530 [http://perma.cc/9WVM-HQLY].
2 See, e.g., infra Part II.B.2.
3 Twitter is a social media website that allows people to share their thoughts with the
world in 140 characters or less. Posting on Twitter is referred to as “tweeting.” See Alisa
Brownlee, Social Media—Making Connections Through Technology, ALS ASS’N (Feb. 13,
2014), http://www.als-ny.org/blog/category/twitter/ [http://perma.cc/5X2U-CU4Q].
4 See infra Part III.A.
5 See infra Part I.A; see also Professor Salaita Speaks for First Time About Losing
University of Illinois Tenured Position over Gaza Tweets, CTR. FOR CONST. RTS. (Sept. 9,
2014), http://ccrjustice.org/home/press-center/press-releases/professor-salaita-speaks-first
-time-about-losing-university [http://perma.cc/A9FW-HASD].
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Professor Salaita’s situation is merely illustrative as it is one of increasing impor-
tance as many are finding themselves in similar circumstances.6 Part II will give a
history of the First Amendment, addressing the general background,7 the limitations
that have been placed on the First Amendment for national security concerns,8 and its
relation to social media, which will include a discussion of United States v. Mehanna.9
After discussing the First Amendment in depth, Part III will heavily analyze and cri-
tique First Amendment implications in using proterrorist speech online, particularly
social media, to convict under the Material Support Statute. Part III will also come back
to Professor Salaita and look at the criminal liability that he could face for his tweets.10
This Note will then evaluate the potential ramifications of this outcome11 and offer
three unsatisfying solutions to these ramifications.12 Part III will end with a discus-
sion of policy considerations: the importance of preserving the First Amendment, the
necessity of protecting national security, and how to resolve this tension.13
I. THE STORY OF STEVEN SALAITA AND OTHERS CAUGHT
TWEETING FOR TERRORISM
A. Professor Steven Salaita
“Let’s cut to the chase: If you’re defending #Israel right now you’re an awful
human being.”14 This is just one of hundreds of Steven Salaita’s anti-Israel tweets
from the summer of 2014.15 Salaita, a Palestinian American,16 began his academic
6 See infra Part I.B; see also Ellie Hall, Inside the Chilling Online World of the Women
of ISIS, BUZZFEED, http://www.buzzfeed.com/ellievhall/inside-the-online-world-of-the-women
-of-isis#b5bhtj [http://perma.cc/4JCQ-EFSY].
7 See infra Part II.A.
8 See infra Part II.B.
9 735 F.3d 32, 44 (1st Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 49 (2014) (involving a plaintiff
who provided material support to a terrorist organization via his online activity, but First
Amendment challenges were made); see also infra Part II.C.
10 See infra Part III.A.
11 See infra Part III.B.
12 See infra Part III.C.
13 See infra Part III.D.
14 Robert Mackey, Professor’s Angry Tweets on Gaza Cost Him a Job, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 12,
2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/13/world/middleeast/professors-angry-tweets-on-gaza
-cost-him-a-job.html [http://perma.cc/D9PB-TMX7]. See generally Steven Salaita (@Steve
Salaita), TWITTER, https://www.twitter.com/stevesalaita [http://perma.cc/KPP3-QHQX] (con-
taining Steven Salaita’s personal Twitter account where all of his tweets can be found).
15 Among these tweets include “Zionists: transforming ‘antisemitism’ from something
horrible into something honorable since 1948.” Mackey, supra note 14. Additionally, a tweet
surfaced that indicated an American reporter should be “met on the point of a shiv.” Reports:
University of Illinois Rescinds Job Offer to Professor over Israel Comments, CBS CHI.
(Aug. 7, 2014, 7:07 AM), http://chicago.cbslocal.com/2014/08/07/reports-university-of-illinois
-rescinds-job-offer-to-professor-over-israel-comments/ [http://perma.cc/DEG4-A6RV]. Salaita
retweeted this, potentially indicating that he approved of this comment. Id.
16 Mackey, supra note 14.
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career in 2006 at Virginia Tech where he was a faculty member in the English De-
partment.17 Salaita earned lifetime tenure at Virginia Tech.18 In October 2013, Salaita
accepted a professorship with lifetime tenure at the University of Illinois at Urbana–
Champaign.19 After moving from Virginia to Illinois, Salaita was fired two weeks
before his start date and without any warning.20
The University of Illinois voted in August 2014 to block Salaita’s appointment
because his tweets supported Palestine and disparaged Israel.21 However, this vote
came after a campaign by pro-Israel students, faculty members, and donors who ar-
gued that Salaita’s tweets were anti-Semitic.22 Salaita’s termination gained national
attention.23 Despite the many individuals who fought for his termination, many more
began fighting for Salaita’s reinstatement.24 This fight was not centered around
fairness or compassion, but around freedom.25 Those fighting for Salaita’s reinstate-
ment used the First Amendment to argue that Salaita’s termination violates his right
to free speech.26
However, this Note explores a more chilling proposition. Although Salaita’s termi-
nation raises red flags, it may raise a larger problem: Can the government criminally
prosecute Salaita for his tweets? Given that Salaita’s tweets may arguably be pro-
Hamas, a designated foreign terrorist organization,27 the government could bring crim-
inal charges against Salaita under the Material Support Statute.28 There is, however,
one constant concern: the First Amendment. Thus, for the government to do this re-
quires proof that the pro-Hamas tweets actually provided material support to Hamas.
17 Steven Salaita, Statement of Steven Salaita, CCRJUSTICE.ORG (Sept. 9, 2014), http://
www.ccrjustice.org/files/Salaita%20Statement_Press%20Conf_09%2008%2014.pdf
[http://perma.cc/P2NU-Q6S8].
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 Mackey, supra note 14.
22 Id.
23 See, e.g., Joseph Erbentraut, Professor Who Lost Job over Anti-Israel Tweets: Univer-
sity Setting a ‘Perilous Standard,’ HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 9, 2014, 7:09 PM), http://www
.huffingtonpost.com/2014/09/09/steven-salaita-university-of-illinois_n_5793370.html [http://
perma.cc/K8SQ-AZ6S].
24 Eighteen thousand people signed a petition to reinstate Salaita, while many more stood
in the rain in Champaign, Illinois, with tape over their mouths reading “reinstate Salaita.” Id.
25 See id.
26 An attorney at the Center for Constitutional Rights commented: “The University has
violated the Constitution by terminating Professor Salaita’s appointment based on the content
of his speech . . . . It has also sent a chilling message to faculty and students everywhere that
the First Amendment and basic principles of academic freedom will be ignored when it comes
to speech that is controversial or critical of the Israeli government.” Id.
27 Foreign Terrorist Organizations, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls
/other/des/123085.htm [http://perma.cc/HS29-9SYM].
28 See generally 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (2000) (codifying the Material Support Statute).
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B. Other Examples
Unfortunately, terrorist organizations continue to haunt America’s security and
freedom. Because of this, Steven Salaita is just one of many whose tweets may be used
against him. With the growing movement of ISIS,29 many have shown support for this
dangerous, anti-American organization through Twitter.30 In fact, one Twitter user is
finding that it is frightfully easy to become a poster child for a terrorist organization.31
Jennifer Williams is a young, blonde American woman who became a star to ISIS
supporters in less than 140 characters.32 Like Salaita, Williams took to Twitter to ex-
press her feelings about Islam.33 She tweeted: “Sorry I read the Quran to learn abt ter-
rorist beliefs but ended up converting to Islam b/c of what it said. #MuslimApologies
#sorrynotsorry.”34 ISIS supporters began retweeting this, and Williams continued to
show her support, most notably by tweeting a picture of pro-ISIS graffiti she found
in Washington, D.C.35 ISIS supporters are now using Williams’s tweets as a means
to show that a blonde American woman supports ISIS’s ideals.36 While Williams de-
nounces her support for ISIS, she is one example of how tweets can be used by a
foreign terrorist organization to show support.37
Unlike Williams, other Americans have fallen victim to these online recruiting
efforts and have actually attempted to join, and fight with, terrorist groups. One very
recent and particularly troubling case involves a young boy, just seventeen years old
when he converted to Islam after searching for education about religion online.38
Shelton Thomas Bell, the defendant, found radical preaching online from Anwar
29 ISIS stands for Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. It is a terrorist organization that has
threatened many, including Great Britain, if it continues its “evil alliance with America.” ISIS
Fast Facts, CNN, http://www.cnn.com/2014/08/08/world/isis-fast-facts/ [http://perma.cc
/5RZE-ME4R] (last updated Sept. 17, 2015, 9:35 PM).
30 See Hall, supra note 6 (describing a tweet from a young woman stating “[o]nly after be-
coming the wife of a[n ISIS fighter] do you realise why there is so much reward in this action”).
31 Jennifer Williams, How a Blonde Tattooed Texas Girl Became an ISIS Twitter Star,
LAWFARE (Oct. 2, 2014, 4:49 PM), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2014/10/how-a-blonde-tattooed
-texas-girl-became-an-isis-twitter-star/ [http://perma.cc/R7CG-WPVP] (“Last Monday, I had
60 followers on Twitter. Today, I have more than 4,300 . . . . But here’s the problem: A
healthy number of them are Islamic extremists, including no small number of supporters of
the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) . . . . And some of them want to marry me.”).
32 Id. (“It’s also interesting that [ISIS members] chose to make [my face] blurry rather
than to black it out entirely—I suppose they did that so you could still tell that I was a blonde,
white American girl. The holy grail of Muslim converts—so to speak.”).
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 Id. (“A friend of mine . . . emailed me to let me know that my conversion-story tweet was
being used as propaganda by [Islamic radicals] in Arabic-language social media circles.”).
38 United States v. Bell, No. 3:13-cr-141-J-32JRK, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4447, at *7
(M.D. Fla. Jan. 14, 2015).
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al-Awlaki,39 a significant spokesman and recruiter for al-Qa’ida.40 Bell hung on al-
Awlaki’s every word, listening to hundreds of hours of terrorist propaganda online.41
It was only after viewing this material online that Bell decided to join al-Awlaki’s
terrorist efforts.42 Bell gathered a group of friends, who joined the “cause” with him,
and the small group began training to fight the United States in Florida.43 In fact, these
online efforts were so effective that Bell and his group began to fashion explosives
to practice for war.44 After a failed attempt to travel to Yemen, Bell and a juvenile
friend were eventually arrested in Florida and charged with conspiracy to provide
material support to terrorists.45 In March 2014, Bell pleaded guilty.46
Bell’s story, although very different from Jennifer Williams’s story,47 shows that
terrorists’ efforts to recruit members online can be successful. His story outlines what
can happen if the government fails to take action. However, Bell’s story focuses on his
actions of betrayal against the United States, rather than his words. While the internet
provided him with the terrorist propaganda, his actions ultimately led to his demise.48
However, those who turn to Twitter, Facebook, and other social media websites
to shout their support for terrorist organizations to the world and in turn help such
terrorist organizations recruit individuals like Shelton Bell may face prosecution if
it is deemed that these tweets constitute providing material support.49 In this uncer-
tain time, American security is not the only thing under attack, the First Amendment
is also facing destruction in this never-ending battle.
II. WHAT DOES THE FIRST AMENDMENT REALLY PROTECT? A LOOK BACK
INTO THE HISTORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT
A. General Background
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohib-
iting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press;
39 Anwar al-Awlaki was a duel citizen of Yemen and the United States. Id. at *9.
40 Id. at *7–9.
41 Id. at *10.
42 Id.
43 Id. at *10–11 (“To prepare themselves mentally and physically, Bell and his group began
to train with firearms that Bell supplied, to continue consuming extremist media, and to
record their own videos that Bell . . . directed another member of the group to post online.”).
44 Bell said to one of the juveniles in his group, regarding the explosives, “It may stink,
but how [sic] you think the battlefield is gonna smell?” Id. at *13.
45 Id. at *15–17.
46 Id. at *3–4.
47 See Williams, supra note 31 and accompanying text.
48 See Bell, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4447, at *62 (“Bell stands convicted of his actions,
not his beliefs.”).
49 See infra Part III (discussing implications of using the Material Support Statute to
convict proterrorist speech online).
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or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for
a redress of grievances.”50 In 1791, “[i]n that turbulent mix of repressive law and an
audacious press,” the Bill of Rights, including the First Amendment, was added to
the Constitution.51 While fights broke out among states about the Constitution, the
promise of incorporating a Bill of Rights solidified ratification.52 The drafters of the
Bill of Rights created the First Amendment, which was added to the Constitution on
December 15, 1791.53 However, “[t]he birth of the First Amendment threw no light
on how its scope should be understood,” and since its creation, the First Amendment
has been under fire.54
In 1798, just seven years after the First Amendment was adopted, Congress adopted
the Sedition Act, which prohibited “the publication of false, scandalous, and mali-
cious writing against the [g]overnment . . . with intent to defame [it]; . . . or to excite
against [it] the hatred of the good people of the United States . . . .”55 The Sedition
Act was enacted mainly to suppress Republican and Jeffersonian support due to the
impending presidential election of 1800.56 Nonetheless, the Act was marketed as a tool
to protect Americans from the French after the French suffered a bloody revolution.57
Even though the Sedition Act never made it to the Supreme Court, it was upheld by
lower federal courts.58 Fourteen men were prosecuted under this act.59 Although the
Sedition Act disappeared and allowed Americans to appreciate the freedom that the
First Amendment brought, “political use of fear to justify repression” did not disap-
pear.60 In fact, that is one aspect of the Sedition Act that is very much alive today.61
Nearly 120 years later, the Espionage Act was passed in the wake of World War
I, making it a crime to “cause or attempt to cause insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny,
or refusal of duty in the military or naval forces.”62 Much like the Sedition Act of
50 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
51 ANTHONY LEWIS, FREEDOM FOR THE THOUGHT THAT WE HATE: A BIOGRAPHY OF THE
FIRST AMENDMENT 6, 10 (2007). Additionally, by this time, “nine of the original thirteen states
had such provisions in their constitutions or other basic documents.” Id. at 6.
52 Id. at 7–8.
53 Id. at 9.
54 Id. at 10.
55 Earl Pollock, Freedom of Speech, in 1 FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA:
TRADITIONAL ISSUES ON THE FIRST AMENDMENT 153 (Nancy S. Lind & Erik T. Rankin eds.,
2013); see also LEWIS, supra note 51, at 11 (“Violators were subject to imprisonment for up
to two years and a fine of up to $2,000.”).
56 LEWIS, supra note 51, at 12.
57 Id.
58 Pollock, supra note 55, at 153.
59 LEWIS, supra note 51, at 12; see also Pollock, supra note 55, at 153 (“The act expired
by its own terms in 1801, and all those convicted under it were pardoned by Jefferson upon
his taking office as president.”).
60 LEWIS, supra note 51, at 21.
61 Id.
62 Id. at 25 (quoting Espionage Act of 1917, ch. 30, 40 Stat. 217 (current version at 18
U.S.C. § 2388 (2012))).
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1798, the Espionage Act of 1917 criminalized speech.63 The Supreme Court upheld
some of these convictions, with Justice Holmes uttering his famous phrase: “The
most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting
fire in a theatre and causing a panic.”64 In Schenck, Justice Holmes also introduced
the clear and present danger test in which a court must look to whether the words are
used to create “a clear and present danger.”65 Despite the Founders’s attempt to im-
plement protections for Americans during war and peace,66 the Supreme Court recog-
nized in Schenck that the protections offered by the First Amendment are altered
during times of war.67
World War I brought with it new fears that again affected the First Amendment.
Not only did states begin adopting sedition acts,68 but the federal government, for
the first time since 1798, passed the Espionage Act of 1917.69 After World War I, fears
of communism whispered through the nation and prosecutions began.70 Despite these
fears, many still opposed the notion that the First Amendment should be sacrificed in
wartime.71 Justice Brandeis spoke out about the protections afforded by the First
Amendment, allowing a full-scale debate between security and freedom to ensue.
Justice Brandeis argued:
Those who won our independence . . . valued liberty both as an end
and as a means. They believed liberty to be the secret of happiness
63 Id. (“[J]udges told juries to convict if they found a defendant’s words disloyal.”).
64 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (upholding defendants’ conviction
for violating the Espionage Act where they gave leaflets to men urging them to refuse to
submit to the draft into military service).
65 Id. (“The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such circum-
stances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring
about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent.”); see also Abrams v. United
States, 250 U.S. 616, 627 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (arguing that speech producing or
intending “to produce a clear and imminent danger that it will bring about forthwith certain
substantive evils” may be punished) (emphasis added).
66 The Bill of Rights does not signify, in any way, that its protections only apply in times
of peace. In fact, the Founders wanted to protect against the very oppression they suffered
from in Great Britain and create a nation founded upon the one principle that no war could
take away: freedom. See LEWIS, supra note 51, at 8.
67 Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52 (“When a nation is at war many things that might be said in
time of peace are such a hindrance to its effort that their utterance will not be endured so long
as men fight and that no Court could regard them as protected by any constitutional right.”).
68 See LEWIS, supra note 51, at 101 (describing that Montana adopted a state sedition law
that made it a crime to speak poorly about the government during wartime—seventy-nine
individuals from Montana were convicted of violating the state sedition law).
69 Id. at 103.
70 See, e.g., id. at 35 (discussing Anita Whitney, a founding member of the Communist Labor
Party of California, who was convicted of membership advocating “criminal syndicalism”).
71 See, e.g., Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375–76 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring)
(explaining the importance of the First Amendment even during times of war).
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and courage to be the secret of liberty . . . . But they knew that
order cannot be secured merely through fear of punishment for its
infraction; . . . that fear breeds repression; that repression breeds
hate; that hate menaces stable government; that the path of safety
lies in the opportunity to discuss freely supposed grievances and
proposed remedies; and that the fitting remedy for evil counsels
is good ones. . . . [T]hey amended the Constitution so that free
speech and assembly should be guaranteed.72
Brandeis’s words had a significant impact on the First Amendment during times of
fear and war.73 Additionally, the Supreme Court began striking down laws that ad-
versely affected the First Amendment.74 In one case, Herndon v. Lowry,75 the Supreme
Court addressed an issue that has surfaced today: participation in an unpopular, and
potentially dangerous, group.76 Herndon was a member of the Communist party.77
The Supreme Court determined that “to make membership in the [Communist] party
and solicitation of members for that party a criminal offense, punishable by death,
in the discretion of a jury, is an unwarranted invasion of the right of freedom of
speech.”78 This marked a new time period for the Court and gave new strength to the
First Amendment.
Nonetheless, times of war still continued to strain the country and the Court.
Although the Supreme Court made great strides in favor of the First Amendment
post–World War I, World War II set back progress.79 This set back, however, happened
differently and is perhaps far worse than the set backs of World War I. During World
War II, Japanese Americans were relocated because of their heritage.80 In Korematsu
v. United States, an infamous decision, the Supreme Court upheld the conviction of
a Japanese American for refusing to relocate.81
72 Id.
73 See, e.g., LEWIS, supra note 51, at 36–37 (explaining that Anita Whitney was pardoned
by the Governor of California who quoted Brandeis’s passage at length).
74 See id. at 39; see also De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364 (1937) (stressing the
importance of freedom of speech and assembly); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369
(1931) (holding, for the first time, that a California law forbidding the display of a red flag
was unconstitutional because it violated the First Amendment).
75 301 U.S. 242 (1937).
76 Id. at 245.
77 Id.
78 Id. at 261.
79 See generally Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1994) (upholding the con-
stitutionality of Japanese American internment camps).
80 LEWIS, supra note 51, at 112.
81 323 U.S. at 246 (“A military order, however unconstitutional, is not apt to last longer
than the military emergency.”). It is important to note that this decision has been widely
criticized. See, e.g., Farag v. United States, 587 F. Supp. 2d 436, 467 (E.D.N.Y. 2008)
(“[Korematsu] is now widely regarded as a black mark on our constitutional jurisprudence.”).
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Despite this decision, the Supreme Court continued to progress during World
War II, giving significant credence to the First Amendment.82 The Supreme Court
struggled throughout the twentieth century to determine the scope of the First Amend-
ment.83 The United States was plagued with war, hostility, and fear during the first
half of the twentieth century. Unfortunately, the United States would continue to
struggle with uncertainty, hatred, and paralyzing fear as technology developed and
weapons advanced.
B. Limitations Placed on the First Amendment for National Security
Security is like liberty in that many are the crimes committed in
its name.84
Despite the ending of World War II, hatred and fear still plagued the country
and threatened national security. While many kinds of speech are not protected by
the First Amendment,85 some of the most important limitations have been in the
name of national security.86 The constant fear of danger caused the Supreme Court
and Congress to take action limiting the First Amendment in an attempt to protect
national security.
1. Brandenburg: Inciting Violence
In 1969, the Supreme Court opened another category of unprotected speech. In
Brandenburg v. Ohio,87 a Ku Klux Klan leader invited press to a rally and made
derogatory comments about African Americans and Jewish Americans.88 An impor-
tant test arose from this case: speech is not protected by the First Amendment if it
is “directed to incit[e] or produc[e] imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or
produce such action.”89 This test is still in effect today.90
82 See W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (holding that com-
pelling a flag salute violated the First Amendment); see also LEWIS, supra note 51, at 115
(“At the end of World War II the First Amendment seemed to be in a strong position in the
courts and in the country.”).
83 See, e.g., LEWIS, supra note 51, at 115–17.
84 United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 551 (1950) (Jackson, J.,
dissenting).
85 See Pollock, supra note 55, at 154 (stating that perjury, bribery, and obscenity are not
protected by First Amendment).
86 See Timothy Zick, The First Amendment in Trans-Border Perspective: Toward a More
Cosmopolitan Orientation, 52 B.C. L. REV. 941, 958 (2011)
87 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
88 Id. at 445–46.
89 Id. at 447.
90 See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2544 (2012); Holder v. Humanitarian
Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 43–44 (2010) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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Brandenburg furthered an important idea: the notion that the government “can-
not regulate speech based on its content—its subject matter, its message, its ideas, its
viewpoint.”91 Content-based restrictions are tested under a strict scrutiny standard.92
Although there are arguments for and against this test, it is a test that balances the
interests of freedom and security.93
Although this test arose from hate speech following the Civil Rights Movement,
the United States now faces a more turbulent and explosive threat: terrorism. Terror-
ism has deeply threatened America’s security, but it has also created a terrible threat
to the First Amendment.
But perhaps judges, and the rest of us, will be more on guard now
for the rare act of expression—not the burning of a flag or the
racist slang of an undergraduate—that is genuinely dangerous.
I think we should be able to punish speech that urges terrorist
violence to an audience some of whose members are ready to act
on the urging. That is imminence enough.94
In an age of technology where much speech is communicated online, the very hint of
support to a terrorist organization can be said to “urge[ ] terrorist violence” to an audi-
ence that is ready to act.95 If this is imminent, then is online speech really protected
by the First Amendment? In an age of terrorism, the question of imminence becomes
particularly important, and the United States must carefully protect national security.
But, this question simultaneously becomes exceptionally dangerous to the freedom
of speech that the Founders established in 1791.96
2. Material Support Statute
In response to the attacks on September 11, 2001, the United States entered the
War on Terror, and a new era of the First Amendment was born. The First Amend-
ment survived the most gruesome of wars, but it now faces two substantial changes
91 Pollock, supra note 55, at 155.
92 These restrictions are “presumptively unconstitutional, and can be sustained only by
a demonstration of a ‘compelling’ governmental interest.” Id. An example of a content-based
law can be found in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391 (1992) (holding a statute in-
valid where it prohibited messages addressed to race, color, creed, religion, or gender). On the
other hand, content-neutral speech regulations are much more forgiving. These can be “justified
by a showing that [the law] serves a ‘substantial’ or ‘significant’ governmental interest.”
Pollock, supra note 55, at 155. An example of a content-neutral statute can be found in
Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 362–63 (2003) (holding a statute was content-neutral where
its purpose and effect were focused on cross burning rather than the nature of the message).
93 But see Pollock, supra note 55, at 160–61.
94 LEWIS, supra note 51, at 167 (emphasis added).
95 Id.
96 See id. at 9.
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to the world: terrorism and technology. In the face of these attacks, President George
W. Bush authorized a series of programs, including enhanced interrogation techniques
on suspected terrorists, wiretapping of international phone calls, and detention of
American citizens suspected of terrorist ties without trial or access to counsel.97
These programs were created because of fear, much like those created during World
Wars I and II.98 However, there is something much different about these programs:
it is hard to envision an end in sight.99
Nonetheless, even before the attacks on September 11, 2001, Congress enacted
a statute that addressed concerns regarding terrorism. In 1996, Congress enacted the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act after a bombing at a federal building
in Oklahoma City.100 This created criminal liability for anyone who provided “‘mate-
rial support’ to foreign groups designated as ‘terrorists’ by the Secretary of State.”101
This became known as the “Material Support Statute.”102
After the War on Terror began, Congress began amending many provisions of
the Material Support Statute.103 These amendments included defining terrorist activity
as any foreign group that engages in “unlawful use of, or threat to use, a weapon
against person or property, unless for mere personal monetary gain.”104 Currently,
there are fifty-nine foreign organizations that the Secretary of State has designated as
“terrorist organizations.”105 After a group has been designated as a foreign terrorist
97 Id. at 127.
98 Id.
99 Id. at 127–28.
100 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat.
1214 (1996); see also David Cole, The First Amendment’s Borders: The Place of Holder v.
Humanitarian Law Project in First Amendment Doctrine, 6 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 147, 151
(2012).
101 Cole, supra note 100, at 151.
102 Id. at 158.
103 The statute, in relevant part, now reads:
(a) Prohibited activities. (1) Unlawful conduct. Whoever knowingly pro-
vides material support or resources to a foreign terrorist organization,
or attempts or conspires to do so, shall be fined under this title or im-
prisoned not more than 15 years, or both, and, if the death of any person
results, shall be imprisoned for any term of years or for life. To violate
this paragraph, a person must have knowledge that the organization is
a designated terrorist organization (as defined in subsection (g)(6)), that
the organization has engaged or engages in terrorist activity, . . . or that
the organization has engaged or engages in terrorism.
18 U.S.C. § 2339B (2000).
104 Cole, supra note 100, at 151 n.13 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a) (2006); id. § 1182(a)(3)
(B)(iii)(V)–(VI) (2006)).
105 See Foreign Terrorist Organizations, supra note 27. The Federal Government announced
in May 2014 that it will be adding six more terrorist organizations to this list. Terrorist
Designations of Groups Operating in Syria, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (May 14, 2014), http://
www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2014/05/226067.htm [http://perma.cc/8YDB-CZD4].
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organization, “it is a crime to knowingly provide ‘material support’ to it.”106 Although
vague, “material support” includes funds, tangible goods, “service,” “expert advice
or assistance,” “training,” and “personnel,” defined as “acting under an organization’s
‘direction or control.’”107 With this statute, the federal government is attempting to pro-
tect the American people from another attack.108 Nonetheless, serious First Amendment
concerns arise with the application of this statute.
3. Humanitarian Law Project and the Coordination Test
Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project109 attempted to challenge the constitution-
ality of the Material Support Statute. In this case, the plaintiffs, six organizations
and two individuals, wanted to provide material support to the Kurdistan Workers’
Party (PKK) and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Ealeam (LTTE).110 Both organiza-
tions were designated as foreign terrorist organizations in 1997.111 In conjunction with
the plaintiffs, the organizations advocated peaceful, nonviolent resolutions to obtain
political freedoms and human rights.112 The Humanitarian Law Project challenged the
Material Support Statute, arguing that its intended activities were constitutionally
permissible.113 One plaintiff, Dr. Nagalingam Jeyualingam, “made cash donations to
organizations that provided assistance to Tamil refugees in Sri Lanka and encouraged
others to make such donations.”114 In large part, this case became so controversial
because the plaintiffs were attempting to provide humanitarian aid.115
In a landmark decision, the Supreme Court upheld the Material Support Statute
as applied to the plaintiffs’ desired activities.116 In particular, plaintiffs sought to train
members of the PKK on humanitarian and international law, teach PKK members
“how to petition various representative bodies such as the United Nations for relief,”
and “engag[e] in political advocacy on behalf of Kurds who live in Turkey” and Tamils
living in Sri Lanka.117
Humanitarian Law Project introduced a new test: the coordination test.118 The
Supreme Court stated that “any independent advocacy in which plaintiffs wish to
106 Cole, supra note 100, at 151.
107 Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(h) (2012).
108 See, e.g., Cole, supra note 100, at 151 (highlighting that the statute criminalizes sup-
port to foreign groups that may harm persons or property).
109 561 U.S. 1 (2010).
110 Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 9 F. Supp. 2d 1176, 1180 (C.D. Cal. 1998), aff’d
in part and rev’d in part, 561 U.S. 1 (2010).
111 Id.
112 Id. at 1181.
113 See Cole, supra note 100, at 151.
114 Humanitarian Law Project, 9 F. Supp. 2d at 1183.
115 See Zick, supra note 86, at 968.
116 Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. at 40; Cole, supra note 100, at 152.
117 Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. at 14–15 (citations omitted).
118 Id. at 24.
2015] #TWEETING FOR TERRORISM 263
engage is not prohibited by § 2339B.”119 However, the term “service” covers “advocacy
performed in coordination with, or at the direction of, a foreign terrorist organiza-
tion.”120 This leaves courts, or more specifically juries who are likely nonsympathetic
to a criminal charge of providing material support to a foreign terrorist organization, to
determine if an individual has acted independently or in coordination with the
terrorist organization. Nonetheless, Chief Justice Roberts was careful in his majority
opinion, stating:
All this is not to say that any future applications of the material-
support statute to speech or advocacy will survive First Amend-
ment scrutiny. . . . We simply hold that, in prohibiting the particular
forms of support that plaintiffs seek to provide to foreign terrorist
groups, § 2339B does not violate the freedom of speech.121
This case has been criticized harshly. David Cole, a famous First Amendment
scholar, argues, “If any speech deserves presumptive protection under the First
Amendment, it is speech advocating lawful, peaceful activity. Until 2010, that was
indeed a core First Amendment principle.”122 Additionally, another scholar, Andrew
Moshirnia, stated, “By manipulating established standards to elevate security over
liberty, the Court served neither principle. It is unclear how speech associated with
foreign terrorist groups deserves less First Amendment protections when that speech
does not advocate imminent lawless conduct.”123 Moshirnia also criticized the Court’s
coordination test, arguing that this “nebulous” test “will likely chill otherwise con-
stitutionally protected speech.”124 The decision’s full impact remains unknown because
it came out just five years ago. Courts, however, are beginning to use this decision
to convict individuals under the Material Support Statute.125
C. The Phenomenon of Social Media
As national security concerns deepened, social media quickly developed as an
avenue for people to communicate and share ideas across the world at the click of
a button. Social media continues to grow rapidly with over 241 million users on
119 Id. (emphasis added).
120 Id. (emphasis added).
121 Id. at 39. The Material Support Statute, as applied in this case, limits content of speech,
and therefore requires the Supreme Court to hold it to a strict scrutiny standard. Id. at 27–28.
122 Cole, supra note 100, at 176.
123 Andrew V. Moshirnia, Valuing Speech and Open Source Intelligence in the Face of
Judicial Deference, 4 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 385, 387 (2013).
124 Id.
125 See, e.g., United States v. Mehanna, 735 F.3d 32, 41 (1st Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 135
S. Ct. 49 (2014).
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Twitter at the end of 2013.126 The growth of social media websites like Twitter has
brought an entirely new set of problems to the First Amendment.
Because technology is new and rapidly expanding, the Court has not had much
time to address First Amendment concerns with social media. Nonetheless, the
Supreme Court has addressed a number of First Amendment cases concerning the
internet.127 Many of these cases, however, have dealt with liability for computer service
providers rather than the actual speech.128
One important case, United States v. Mehanna,129 addressed online activity and
the Material Support Statute. Mehanna is a case that addresses all three issues dis-
cussed in this Note: online activity, First Amendment issues, and national security
concerns.130 Mehanna was charged with four terrorism-related counts, including
“conspiracy to provide material support to al-Qa’ida,” “conspiracy to provide ma-
terial support to terrorists,” “providing and attempting to provide material support
to terrorists,” and “conspiracy to kill persons in a foreign country.”131 The material
support charges were based on two separate activities: Mehanna’s travel to Yemen
and his online translations.132 While some of the most damaging evidence was
Mehanna’s travel to Yemen,133 the government also relied on his online translation
126 Rachel King, Twitter’s First Earnings Report: Active User Count Up 30 Percent to 241
Million, ZDNET (Feb. 5, 2014, 9:07 PM)), http://www.zdnet.com/twitters-first-earnings-report
-active-user-count-up-30-percent-to-241-million-7000026007/ [http://perma.cc/XFQ6-DRKD].
127 See, e.g., Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844 (1997) (addressing the
constitutionality of statutes meant to protect minors from material on the internet); Elonis v.
United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015) (addressing whether threats on Facebook were covered
by the First Amendment).
128 See, e.g., Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d 413, 416, 422 (5th Cir. 2008) (holding that
MySpace, a social media website, was not liable when the defendant’s daughter was able to
create a profile on MySpace, despite being too young, and met a man who sexually assaulted
her); Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1125 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that
Metrosplash was not liable where a user created a fake dating profile that encouraged sex-
ually explicit communication with the defendant); Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327,
328–29 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding that Zeran, a victim of a prank after the Oklahoma City
bombing in which a poster advertised offensive shirts for sale with a message that included
Zeran’s phone number, could not hold America Online, Inc. liable for defamatory speech
initiated by a third party).
129 735 F.3d at 32.
130 See id. at 40 (“Terrorism is the modern-day equivalent of the bubonic plague: it is an
existential threat. Predictably, then, the government’s efforts to combat terrorism through the
enforcement of the criminal laws will be fierce. Sometimes, those efforts require a court to
patrol the fine line between vital national security concerns and forbidden encroachments on
constitutionally protected freedoms of speech and association. This is such a case.”).
131 Id. at 41.
132 Id.
133 Mehanna traveled to Yemen in search of a terrorist training camp. Id. He remained
there for a week, but was unable to locate such a camp. Id.
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of Arab-language materials.134 In 2005, Mehanna began translating Arab-language
materials into English, posting these translations on a website “that comprised an on-
line community for those sympathetic to al-Qa’ida and Salafi-Jihadi perspectives.”135
This website was used “to share[ ] opinions, videos, texts, and kindred materials”
online.136 Mehanna translated al-Qa’ida propaganda and materials that supported al-
Qa’ida.137 He was convicted on all counts.138 Mehanna’s online activity became the
focus of a First Amendment claim.139 The First Circuit barely addressed Mehanna’s
claim that the evidence procured came from his online activity was protected speech.140
The First Circuit concluded that the translations used as material support were premised
on the translations being a “service.”141 The court, using the decision in Humanitarian
Law Project,142 determined that “otherwise-protected speech rises to the level of crim-
inal material support only if it is ‘in coordination with foreign groups that the speaker
knows to be terrorist organizations.’”143 The First Circuit concluded that the district
court appropriately left the question to determine whether enough coordination existed
to criminalize the defendant’s translations to the jury.144
While the Supreme Court denied certiorari,145 Mehanna opened many questions
and set potentially chilling precedent.146 This case, however, gives little guidance for
lower courts. Because Mehanna’s trip to Yemen was so damaging to his case, it is
unknown if mere online translations would have been enough to convict him.
Placing the decision of whether online activity was coordinated with a foreign
terrorist organization on jurors may create a substantial prejudice. Although it has
been over fourteen years since September 11, 2001, many Americans still feel the
pain and hatred from that day and fear anyone who may be involved in any kind of ter-
rorist organization. This begs the question of how social media fits. The Court has
yet to address a case in which activity on Twitter is considered material support, but
both Humanitarian Law Project and Mehanna suggest that, so long as a jury can find
134 Id.
135 Id.
136 Id.
137 Id.
138 Id. at 42.
139 Id. at 47.
140 Id. (“The Court of Appeals is not a sorting hat, divining which criminal defendants’
stories fall into constitutionally protected and unprotected stacks.”).
141 Id. at 49.
142 561 U.S. 1 (2010).
143 Mehanna, 735 F.3d at 49 (citing Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. at 26).
144 Id.
145 See Mehanna v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 49 (2014).
146 Reply to Brief in Opposition at 8, Mehanna v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 49 (2014)
(No. 13-1125) (“The First Circuit’s holding sets disturbing precedent for future government
attacks on speech, with the extreme sanction of criminal conviction.”).
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coordination, the First Amendment does not protect these tweets, potentially making
the tweets enough to convict an individual under the Material Support Statute.147
III. DOES THE FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECT TWEETING IN
SUPPORT OF TERRORISM?
A. Returning to Professor Salaita: An Analysis of His Potentially Criminal Behavior
While social media continues to strengthen as a platform for sharing personal
opinions and views, many forget that the First Amendment does not protect all
speech.148 Professor Salaita, like many others, has found himself in a compromising
position. Not only did he lose his job because of his anti-Israel tweets, but the Material
Support Statute allows the government to seek a more serious remedy.149 For the gov-
ernment to press charges under the Material Support Statute, it would need to prove
that: (1) the tweet(s) evidenced support for a foreign terrorist organization; (2) the
person who tweeted the support knew that the organization was a foreign terrorist
organization; and (3) the tweet(s) were formed in coordination with that foreign ter-
rorist organization.150
In many cases, the first two elements are not difficult to prove. On its face, a tweet
can be seen as showing support simply by looking at its plain language. Furthermore,
if the organization is a well-known terrorist organization, like ISIS or Hamas, and the
individual tweeting is more educated, it will likely not be difficult for the govern-
ment to show that the person tweeting knew that the organization was classified as
a foreign terrorist organization. In Professor Salaita’s case, his tweets seem to be pro-
Hamas. In fact, he states on his twitter, “Will you condemn Hamas? No. Why not?
Because Hamas isn’t the one incinerating children, you disingenuous prick. #Gaza
#GazaUnderAttack.”151 Although Professor Salaita could, and likely would, argue that
this tweet merely expresses an opinion, at the very least, this tweet suggests that his
allegiance lies with Hamas, not with Israel.152 Additionally, Professor Salaita is a pro-
fessor, and an activist, in this area. While more facts are certainly needed, it is likely
that he knew Hamas was a foreign terrorist organization.153
147 See supra Part II.B.3.
148 See Pollock, supra note 55, at 154.
149 See supra Part II.B.2–3.
150 Cf. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 26 (2010).
151 Steven Salaita (@SteveSalaita), TWITTER (July 14, 2014, 10:32 AM), https://www
.twitter.com/stevesalaita/status/488737738666287104 [http://perma.cc/DL4E-SJQ4].
152 See Mackey, supra note 14 (explaining that not all of Professor Salaita’s tweets were
anti-Semitic polemics, but that many arguably endorsed the one-sided pro-Hamas, anti-Israel
politic). The University of Illinois Board of Trustees based their rejection of Professor Salaita
on his polarizing actions. Id.
153 On October 8, 1997, the United States Department of State added Hamas to the list of
foreign terrorist organizations. See Foreign Terrorist Organizations, supra note 27.
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As in most, if not all, cases that involve this type of speech, the government would
face its biggest challenge in proving that a person’s tweets were either “in coordina-
tion with” or “at the direction of” a foreign terrorist organization.154 Courts have yet to
weigh in on difficult cases in which coordination is debated.155 Since Humanitarian
Law Project, most cases have included other extremely damaging evidence, specifi-
cally traveling overseas to train with a terrorist organization.156 It is, therefore, diffi-
cult to say what a court, or more specifically a jury, would do if confronted with only
tweets that support a foreign terrorist organization. In Professor Salaita’s case, if the
only evidence presented were his tweets, the jury would likely find it difficult to find
that Professor Salaita acted in coordination with Hamas. Tweets alone fit neatly into
“wholly independent” speech that is not prohibited by 18 U.S.C. § 2339B.157
Nonetheless, any remote connection to a foreign terrorist organization may be
enough under 18 U.S.C. § 2339B.158 For Professor Salaita, that could mean that if any
relative or friend of his is a member of Hamas, with whom he has been in contact,
could be enough to show that his tweets were “in coordination with” Hamas. This type
of communication could show that Professor Salaita tweeted at a specific Hamas mem-
ber; however, it would be difficult to prove. Additionally, because Twitter is a platform
where millions of people can see one’s tweets instantaneously, if Professor Salaita was
in contact with members of Hamas about their efforts against Israel, it could be argued
that he tweeted for the purpose of gaining support or even recruiting new members
for Hamas, thus providing a service to the group. Even if Professor Salaita’s tweets
154 See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 26 (2010).
155 This may be because federal prosecutors are careful to bring cases where the main
argument comes down to freedom of speech versus security. In a case where coordination
is not clear by other means, the government faces the burden of proving that the speech was
“in coordination with, or at the direction of, a foreign terrorist organization,” and not wholly
independent. Id. This is a high hurdle for the government, and may be a question that the
Court never has to face.
156 See United States v. Hassan, 742 F.3d 104, 113–14, 117 (4th Cir. 2014), cert. denied,
135 S. Ct. 157 (2014) (holding that the First Amendment rights of the defendants, who were
convicted of terrorism related charges, were not violated despite the government using the
defendants’ violent speech that they posted on Facebook to prove intent because other evi-
dence revealed that defendants had traveled to Jordan to engage in violent Jihad and served
as enough proof of providing material support); see also Mehanna, 735 F.3d at 41.
157 The government would have a much more difficult time prosecuting Professor Salaita
under 18 U.S.C. § 2339A. 18 U.S.C. § 2339A requires that the defendant knows that, or intends
for, the material support provided to be used in preparation for, in carrying out, in preparation
for concealment of an escape from, or in carrying out the concealment of an escape from a
crime of terrorism. See CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41334, TERRORIST
MATERIAL SUPPORT: A SKETCH OF 18 U.S.C. 2339A AND 2339B, (July 19, 2010), https://www
.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R41334.pdf [http://perma.cc/Q7M2-G2HA]. Therefore, because 18
U.S.C. § 2339A is much more difficult for the government to prove than 18 U.S.C. § 2339B,
and thus faces less criticism, this Note focuses on 18 U.S.C. § 2339B.
158 See id.
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were arguably to stop the war between Israelis and Palestinians, peaceful support,
when done in coordination with a foreign terrorist organization, is still prohibited.159
Furthermore, Professor Salaita’s tweets have been interpreted as advocating anti-
Semitism and violence against Israel.160 Although Professor Salaita is entitled to his
own thoughts and opinions, if presented with evidence of these tweets and evidence
of direct communication with a foreign terrorist organization, a jury would likely not
hesitate to convict. Based on the standard announced in Humanitarian Law Project,
and supported in Mehanna, Professor Salaita’s tweets could land him in a federal
prison if the government found any additional link between him and Hamas.161
Professor Salaita is only one of many taking to Twitter. In his case, the government
would be unlikely to find a connection with Hamas. There is no evidence that he had
any direct contact with anyone in Hamas, nor is there any evidence to suggest that
his tweets were not merely his opinion. However, more chilling cases are surfacing.
Terrorist organizations are now using Twitter and other social media platforms to re-
cruit new members.162 ISIS, in particular, is succeeding in recruiting Western women
through online efforts.163 A nineteen-year-old American nursing student, Shannon
Conley, fell victim to these online efforts.164 She met an ISIS terrorist online, and from
there, she began the process of joining ISIS.165 She was apprehended by police while
trying to board a flight to Turkey.166 Conley admitted that she “wanted to use her
American military training to wage jihad on the U.S.”167 Although Conley pleaded
guilty to conspiracy to provide material support to a foreign terrorist organization,168
she is not the only one being lured into terrorist organizations through social media.169
Using social media to recruit Americans has become a problem that the Material
159 See Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. at 8–9.
160 See Mackey, supra note 14 (explaining Professor Salaita’s tweets and describing them
as anti-Semitic).
161 In Mehanna, the defendant’s online speech was coupled with his attempts to train with
a terrorist organization. Mehanna, 735 F.3d at 41. In this case, a potential connection between
Professor Salaita and Hamas is more tenuous.
162 See Katie Zavadski, Meet the Female Recruiters of ISIS, N.Y. MAG. (Sept. 4, 2014,
10:10 AM), http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2014/09/meet-the-female-recruiters-of-isis
.html [http://perma.cc/V5S7-X2PC].
163 Id.
164 Snejana Farberov & Daniel Bates, Denver Woman Charged Plotting to Join ISIS
Militants, DAILY MAIL (July 2, 2014, 6:18 PM), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article
-2678662/Denver-woman-19-charged-plotting-join-ISIS-militants-wage-jihad-U-S.html
[http://perma.cc/T936-VZ4A].
165 Id.
166 Id.
167 Id.
168 Colorado Teen Shannon Conley’s Support of ISIS Raises Alarm About American Jihadists,
CBS NEWS (Sept. 10, 2014, 10:02 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/colorado-teen-shannon
-conleys-support-of-isis-raises-alarm-about-american-jihadists/ [http://perma.cc/82KZ-7NG2]
[hereinafter Colorado Teen Shannon Conley].
169 See Zavadski, supra note 164.
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Support Statute may address. As young Americans are lured in through foreign
terrorist organizations’ online efforts, tweets and other social media activity indicate
that these young Americans may trade in their lives of freedom to fight against the
United States. In fact, Shannon Conley changed her Facebook to say that she
worked as a “slave for Allah.”170 If she had not pleaded guilty, her activity on social
media certainly would have been used against her in a trial. While Professor Salaita
and Shannon Conley are two very different individuals with very different stories,
both reveal how tweeting for terrorism has become a dangerous game to play.
B. Potential Ramifications in Situations like Professor Salaita’s
While the Material Support Statute is designed to offer protection against terrorism,
it also limits a piece of freedom. Professor Salaita will not likely be charged under the
Material Support Statute because he has no clear connection to Hamas. If he did have
a connection, though, his personal beliefs would be put on trial. Similarly, Shannon
Conley’s beliefs would have been put on trial if she had not pleaded guilty.171 Twelve
Americans would be tasked with deciding the fate of Shannon Conley, an admitted
traitor.172 If she had not pleaded guilty, a jury would have been left to decide whether
she conspired to provide material support to a foreign terrorist organization. Shannon
Conley’s case is simple; her online activity only corroborates the other evidence against
her. She admitted to both her desires to join ISIS and fight against the United States.173
Shannon Conley admitted to betrayal, and a jury would almost certainly convict her.
Professor Salaita’s situation is much more difficult. The Supreme Court has given
little guidance on an issue like this.174 Because the only evidence of Professor Salaita’s
allegiance with Hamas is his tweets, a jury would likely be torn between protecting
what appears to be only speech and ensuring that a potential threat to the country is
not let free.
If a jury ever convicted Professor Salaita of providing material support to Hamas,
the First Amendment would be significantly compromised. Social media would provide
a platform for a witch-hunt, and the freedom that the Founders fought for would be
diminished.175 On the other hand, if he were not convicted, it could solidify terrorist
organizations’ recruitment process through social media, but only if his tweets were
actually in support of a terrorist organization. Communication across borders is in-
creasingly common. In fact, “[t]he speech of U.S. citizens now routinely crosses bor-
ders, and the speech of foreigners easily reaches our shores.”176 Online speech is a
170 Farberov & Bates, supra note 166.
171 See Colorado Teen Shannon Conley, supra note 170.
172 Id.
173 Id.
174 See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 7–8 (2010).
175 This would be much like the speech condemned during earlier times of war, as seen
in World War I, World War II, and the Cold War. See LEWIS, supra note 51, at 101, 104.
176 Zick, supra note 86, at 946.
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dangerous weapon, and foreign terrorist organizations are taking advantage and using
online speech as a weapon against the United States by recruiting its own citizens.177
Both outcomes in a case like Professor Salaita’s pose significant risks and problems.
It highlights, however, the need for guidance on the issue and the flaws inherent in
the Humanitarian Law Project decision.
The Material Support Statute condemns Shannon Conley from leaving the
United States to go fight on behalf of ISIS. It also condemns Professor Salaita from
providing any type of support, including nonviolent, peaceful support, to Hamas.178
Both situations are vastly different, but both are controlled by the coordination test
in Humanitarian Law Project.179 Despite their differences, Shannon Conley and
Professor Salaita are both restricted from providing any type of support to any des-
ignated foreign terrorist organization. But is this right?
Scholars argue that the coordination test is fundamentally flawed and unneces-
sarily restricts freedom of speech. Among them, David Cole argues that the limita-
tions taken by the Supreme Court are not enough.180 In Humanitarian Law Project,
the Supreme Court determined that the Material Support Statute would not prohibit
support from domestic terrorist organizations; only those who provide support to
foreign terrorist groups could be punished.181 Cole argues that “[i]f the government
could not constitutionally prohibit training a disfavored domestic organization how
to advocate for its rights, it should not be permitted to prohibit the same training
simply because it is directed to a disfavored foreign organization.”182 If Professor
Salaita and Shannon Conley provided material support to a domestic terrorist orga-
nization, their behavior would be considered protected speech, not criminal.183
There are inherent dangers any time the Court limits speech. The consequences
of Humanitarian Law Project are far reaching. Nonviolent, peaceful support is no
longer tolerated among foreign terrorist organizations.184 At first glance, this rule
may appear necessary: cutting all ties with terrorist organizations makes it clear that
the United States will not support any behavior from these groups. This means that
the only way to gain support from Americans, and its organizations, is to stop fighting
against the United States and its allies, therefore removing itself from the list of
177 See, e.g., Colorado Teen Shannon Conley, supra note 170; see also Zavadski, supra
note 164.
178 Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. at 36 (“[T]he political branches have adequately
substantiated their determination that, to serve the Government’s interest in preventing ter-
rorism, it was necessary to prohibit material support in the form of training, expert advice,
personnel, and services to foreign terrorist groups, even if the supporters meant to promote
only the groups’ nonviolent ends.”).
179 Id. at 35–36.
180 Cole, supra note 100, at 169–70.
181 See generally 561 U.S. at 16–18.
182 Cole, supra note 100, 170–71.
183 Id.
184 Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. at 33.
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foreign terrorist organizations. Nonetheless, this “with us or against us” attitude may
cause more harm than good. Many terrorist organizations do not have the same
fundamental values as the United States. Some organizations turn to violence, but
when an organization seeks assistance to help ensure that it is provided basic human
rights protections in nonviolent, peaceful means, an uneasy message is sent—terrorist
organizations are not worthy of basic human rights. They must back down from
America and its allies in order to receive the most basic human rights. This troubling
message only adds further animosity. It penalizes those who advocate nonviolent,
peaceful means, leaving terrorist organizations with no resources to help them obtain
the basic rights they deserve without violence. As social media platforms grow in-
creasingly more popular, and as terrorist organizations grow stronger, there is a need
for clarity and resolve. “Independent advocacy” is vague and difficult to define.185
The Humanitarian Law Project decision changed the First Amendment, placing more
restrictions on it for speech involving foreign terrorist organizations.186 It ended the
choice for Shannon Conley to move overseas and join ISIS, but it may have also
ended Professor Salaita’s ability to tweet his support for Hamas.
C. Possible Solutions
There are serious consequences of Humanitarian Law Project and the reach of
the Material Support Statute, and the few possible solutions prove unsettling. First,
the United States could abandon the standard in Humanitarian Law Project. Instead,
the Court or the legislature could enact a standard that requires a showing of coordi-
nation and support of violent behavior. Humanitarian Law Project punishes organi-
zations that seek to help terrorist organizations solve their problems by going to the
United Nations and seeking their aims in nonviolent means.187 This sends a chilling
message to foreign terrorist organizations, and only encourages violence. A different
standard that allows for individuals and organizations to help terrorist organizations
in a peaceful manner would solve that problem. It may nonetheless pose a greater
threat. This type of standard would blur lines, making it easier for those who want
to help terrorist organizations, even in violent ways, get away with furthering ter-
rorist violence and hatred against the United States. Therefore, this solution would
cause too much confusion and leave too many loopholes open for Americans to begin
helping terrorists.
A second solution is to read Humanitarian Law Project narrowly and only apply
it for purposes of national security. Cole suggests that the decision is “best harmo-
nized with precedent if read narrowly to rest on all three features—regulation of
speech coordinated with foreign groups for national security purposes.”188 However,
185 Cole, supra note 100, at 171.
186 561 U.S. at 8.
187 Id. at 21–22.
188 Cole, supra note 100, at 174.
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applying the standard only for national security purposes hardly changes anything.
The United States has entered a global war against terrorism that has only gotten
worse throughout the years, and its national security is constantly threatened. With
the rise of technology, terrorist organizations are now using social media to speak
directly to both Americans who wish to join them and Americans who want to defy
them. When a terrorist organization is involved, whether an individual wants to pro-
vide nonviolent support or not, America’s national security is threatened. The gov-
ernment will easily satisfy the first element in material support cases. Therefore, this
solution offers little help as well.
Finally, Cole suggests that the rule in Humanitarian Law Project only applies
to foreign terrorist organizations.189 This is another solution that has already been
implemented. Humanitarian Law Project can, and has, been interpreted narrowly.190
In fact, the Ninth Circuit held in Al Haramain Islamic Foundation, Inc. v. United
States Department of the Treasury (AHIF)191 that the government cannot ban support
of domestic terrorist organizations.192 In AHIF, the plaintiff was a non-profit organi-
zation incorporated in Oregon.193 It described itself as a “charitable organization that
seeks to promote greater understanding of the Islamic religion through operating
prayer houses, distributing religious publications, and engaging in other charitable
activities.”194 The group, however, was suspected by the United States government
of supporting terrorism. The Office of Foreign Assets Control froze AHIF–Oregon’s
assets and designated it a “specially designated global terrorist.”195 AHIF also had
a Saudi Arabia branch, and the two shared some leaders.196 The Ninth Circuit ruled
in favor of the plaintiff, distinguishing this case from Humanitarian Law Project by
stating that the entities were wholly foreign, whereas AHIF–Oregon was at least partly
domestic.197 This standard protects domestic organizations, and does little harm to
the Material Support Statute. If terrorist organizations seek to take advantage of this,
they will need to open a branch within the United States, incorporate, and follow the
laws of the United States . It is difficult to see organizations like ISIS taking this path,
especially when it is easy for terrorists to gain support through online activity.
However, while this standard helps lessen the fear that the First Amendment is
slowly being shaved away, it does little to resolve the issue of online speech. This solu-
tion defines who can receive material support, but not what material support is or what
it takes to constitute “in coordination with” a terrorist organization. Nonetheless,
189 Id.
190 Id.
191 660 F.3d 1019 (9th Cir. 2011).
192 Id. at 1023.
193 Id.
194 Id. at 1024.
195 Id. at 1023.
196 Id. at 1024.
197 Id. at 1051.
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guidance on these two points will not come until a case is brought that involves mainly
online activity. Only then will courts be forced to confront this issue.
D. Policy Considerations for Why Humanitarian Law Project Is the
Best Compromise
America has struggled between freedom and security since its founding. With
each war that has passed, a balance has been struck between the two. This balance
is a give and take, where one is inevitably sacrificed more than the other. The gov-
ernment and the Supreme Court have taken great pains to equalize this balance.
However, when a new threat arises the First Amendment often becomes compro-
mised.198 Because of this, it is not surprising that the government, and the Court, have
leaned in favor of preserving antiterrorism efforts.199 It is even more understandable
when terrorism is compared with other threats the United States has faced. The
United States has been attacked only a few times on its own soil. The first occurred on
December 7, 1941, when the Japanese attacked a naval base at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii,
forcing the United States to enter World War II.200 The most recent attack was much
different. During a time of supposed peace, terrorists attacked civilians on Septem-
ber 11, 2001. As the United States faced a new threat, specifically in the middle of
incredible technological advances, the Court was forced to deal with a novel obstacle
to the First Amendment.
The standard set in Humanitarian Law Project offers the best safeguard to
national security while still maintaining much of the protections afforded by the First
Amendment. By implementing the coordination test,201 the government is required
198 See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 224 (1944) (Frankfurter, J., con-
curring) (“The provisions of the Constitution which confer on the Congress and the President
powers to enable this country to wage war are as much part of the Constitution as provisions
looking to a nation at peace.”); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (upholding
a conviction under the Espionage Act in 1919 in which the Court stated that “[w]hen a nation
is at war many things that might be said in time of peace are such a hindrance to its effort that
their utterance will not be endured so long as men fight and that no Court could regard them
as protected by any constitutional right.”). But see Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359,
369 (1931) (holding, for the first time, a California law forbidding the display of a red flag
unconstitutional because it violated the First Amendment).
199 See President George W. Bush, President’s Address in Cincinnati, Ohio (Oct. 2, 2002),
http://www.edition.cnn.com/2002/ALLPOLITICS/10/07/bush.transcript/ [http://perma.cc/2YDG
-ZNBZ] (“We also must never forget the most vivid events of recent history. On September 11,
2001, America felt its vulnerability—even to threats that gather on the other side of the earth.
We resolved then, and we are resolved today, to confront every threat, from any source, that
could bring sudden terror and suffering to America.”).
200 See Pearl Harbor, HISTORY.COM, http://www.history.com/topics/world-war-ii/pearl
-harbor [http://perma.cc/5GYN-4YL8].
201 See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 24–26 (2010).
274 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 24:251
to prove a link to a foreign terrorist organization.202 This is not necessarily an easy
task for prosecutors. Finding a link requires more than a tweet, likely more than a
“retweet” or “favorite” by a foreign terrorist organization; it will require communi-
cation with terrorists.
Although it is unknown exactly what is enough to satisfy the coordination test,
it is also unlikely that the government will prosecute everyone who vocalizes sup-
port for foreign terrorist organizations.203 Thus far, the government has only prose-
cuted cases involving individuals who actively attempted to join a foreign terrorist
organization with the intent to fight against the United States.204 There is no indica-
tion that the government has attempted, or will attempt to, use the Material Support
Statute to criminalize speech for the sake of limiting proterrorist speech. On the con-
trary, the government’s goal seems to be to stop new threats from arising;205 namely
to stop terrorist efforts to recruit Americans through social media and to stop Americans
from joining these organizations. The main goal in doing so is to eliminate threats
against the United States rather than to limit speech in an attempt to merely stop others
from voicing different ideals than that of the United States.206
Because of the importance of preventing another terrorist attack,207 the burden of
proving an individual has acted “in coordination with” a foreign terrorist organization
202 Id.
203 But see Nicolás Medina Mora, How a Post-9/11 Law Can Get You Arrested for Your
Emoji Choices, BUZZFEED NEWS (Jan. 29, 2015, 7:52 AM), http://www.buzzfeed.com/nicolas
medinamora/how-a-post-911-law-can-get-you-arrested-for-your-emoji-choic#.hpG9w0xj0n
[http://perma.cc/T5ZC-35CW] (explaining how a Brooklyn teen was arrested on terrorism
charges after he tweeted “emojis,” which were cartoon illustrations of a police officer’s head
and a gun pointed at it).
204 See United States v. Mehanna, 735 F.3d 32, 44 (1st Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct.
49 (2014); United States v. Bell, No. 3:13-cr-141-J-32JRK, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4447, at
*1–2 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 14, 2015); Farberov & Bates, supra note 166.
205 Online speech often leads the government to find dangerous new threats. See, e.g.,
Edmund DeMarche, 3 Arrested in New York City for Allegedly Conspiring to Support ISIS,
FOX NEWS (Feb. 25, 2015), http://www.foxnews.com/us/2015/02/25/3-arrested-in-brooklyn
-for-allegedly-consipring-to-support-isis/  [http://perma.cc/8PGC-9U7F] (describing how two
men who “came to the attention of law enforcement,” after law enforcement saw they had
posted online support for Islamic militants, have been arrested for providing material support
to ISIS, and have admitted that if ISIS directed them to, they would bomb Coney Island, shoot
American soldiers, and harm President Obama).
206 For example, the Sedition Act of 1798 attempted to limit speech because it wanted to
limit support for Jefferson during a presidential election. Pollock, supra note 55, at 153 (dis-
cussing Sedition Act of 1798, ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596 (expired 1801)). The Sedition Act did not
protect the United States from outside threats that have the potential to launch a widespread
attack on Americans, but rather was only intended to limit speech for political reasons. Id.
207 See President’s Address in Cincinnati, Ohio, supra note 201 (“America must not ignore
the threat gathering against us. Facing clear evidence of peril, we cannot wait for the final
proof—the smoking gun—that could come in the form of a mushroom cloud.”).
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to be convicted under the Material Support Statute,208 and the government’s limited
use of this statute in prosecuting those who truly threaten America’s security,209 the
Humanitarian Law Project decision does not jeopardize the First Amendment. Instead,
it ensures that the government seeks convictions of individuals who are threats to the
United States, while preserving freedom of speech by excluding independent advocacy
from the Material Support Statute.210
Instead of limiting the First Amendment, Humanitarian Law Project actually
strengthens free speech by emphasizing that the government cannot go on a witch-
hunt, using only tweets and other social media posts, to convict individuals under
the Material Support Statute. By requiring that these posts be “in coordination with”
a foreign terrorist organization, the Supreme Court has made the best compromise
between protecting the First Amendment and preserving antiterrorism efforts.
CONCLUSION
On September 11, 2001, the entire country was shaken with fear, resentment, and
hatred. Two of America’s tallest buildings, symbolizing freedom above all else, fell
to ashes because a radical Islamic terrorist group attacked the United States. During
this attack, as the Twin Towers fell to ashes, so too did America’s sense of security.
On September 11, 2001, the United States was forever changed.
As the War on Terror began, technology continued to advance. Social media web-
sites, like Facebook and Twitter, emerged as platforms for communication. People
from around the world flocked to these websites to share their stories, thoughts, and
beliefs, including terrorists. Terrorists began to take advantage of social media as a
way to lure in new members, specifically targeting Americans. These recruiting tactics
have been successful, with some Americans turning their backs on the United States
in an attempt to fight against it.
These recruiting tactics cause First Amendment concerns. In an age of technol-
ogy, is a tweet that reaches millions who are ready to act in just seconds, advocating
for ISIS or al-Qa’ida, for example, inciting imminent violence, and therefore not pro-
tected by the First Amendment? More to the point, is a tweet, used as a recruiting
technique, providing material support to a foreign terrorist organization? The Supreme
Court has not answered either question, but both leave the government in a difficult
position: protect the First Amendment or protect the public from threats of terrorism?
Professor Salaita was placed in a difficult position when he was fired for his anti-
Israel tweets.211 However, his tweets could have a much more devastating impact if
208 Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 24–26.
209 See, e.g., Mehanna, 735 F.3d at 44; Bell, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4447, at *1–2; Farberov
& Bates, supra note 166.
210 See Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. at 24 (“[A]ny independent advocacy in which
plaintiffs wish to engage is not prohibited by [the Material Support Statute].”).
211 Mackey, supra note 14.
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the government were to ever prove that he acted in coordination with Hamas.212 Not
only could the government then use these tweets to criminally prosecute Professor
Salaita under the Material Support Statute, but terrorist organizations might use Pro-
fessor Salaita’s tweets, like ISIS did with Jennifer Williams’s tweets, to recruit future
terrorists.213 It is people like Shelton Bell and Shannon Conley that highlight the im-
portance of this issue. Both fell victim to terrorist organizations, Conley to ISIS and
Bell to al-Qa’ida. Both attempted to leave the United States to wage war against their
own country. Both remind us that terrorism is still very much alive, and that these
organizations are not going anywhere any time soon.214
To protect the First Amendment in an era of constant, instant communication,
Humanitarian Law Project’s coordination test provides the best compromise to al-
low the government to prosecute individuals who are truly working on behalf of a
foreign terrorist organization. This test protects tweets so long as those tweets are
merely words, not intended to provide aid to a foreign terrorist organization. This test
allows individuals to voice their concerns and beliefs, yet punishes them for recruiting
or for joining terrorist organizations. The coordination test does not take away free-
dom afforded by the First Amendment. Rather, it strengthens the First Amendment
by maintaining that independent speech alone is not enough to convict under the
Material Support Statute.
Nonetheless, the War on Terror has created new challenges to the First Amend-
ment. The fear from September 11, 2001, is still very much alive. With this seemingly
never-ending battle against terrorists, new fears and challenges arise almost daily. In an
era of constant war, terrorism has indeed shaken our foundation.
212 See Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. at 24–26.
213 See Williams, supra note 31.
214 See Ben Brumfield, Pamela Brown & Dana Ford, FBI Says Plot to Attack U.S. Capitol
Was Ready to Go, CNN (last updated Jan. 15, 2015, 5:34 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/01
/15/us/capitol-attack-plot/ [http://perma.cc/V2HQ-TXC9] (explaining that another twenty-
year-old man was arrested after meeting an ISIS member online, tweeting about his support
for ISIS, and planning to bomb the U.S. Capitol in the name of ISIS).
